IAEA safeguards : coping with uncertainty in international verification

Abstract

This thesis examines the process by which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verifies the compliance of non-nuclear-weapon states with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and comprehensive safeguards agreements. The verification process consists of two interlocking phases: (1) planning verification activities and allocating verification resources, and (2) analysing collected data and drawing conclusions. Approaches to the two phases of verification are of central relevance to current policy debates on the development of the IAEA’s ‘state level concept’ for safeguards and for the resolution of compliance issues in several countries, particularly Iran and Syria. The continued absence of a substantive definition of non-compliance, or even a well defined procedure for exposing non-compliance, coupled with the IAEA’s increasing differentiation between states in order to meet verification objectives with limited resources, leave the IAEA and its safeguards regime vulnerable to claims of being ineffective, inefficient, irrelevant or discriminatory. Safeguards experts acknowledge that the identification and clarification of principles for determining safeguards priorities and for deriving safeguards conclusions will be a crucial step in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In addition to assisting the development of these missing principles, the results of this thesis have broader consequences for the structure and development of international verification organisations. The approach taken by the IAEA is constrained by uncertainties inherent in the nature of the information sources available, the nuclear choices of states, and international responses to alleged violations, as well as ambiguities in the choice of verification standard. This thesis argues that efforts to reform the structure and procedures of the IAEA should use these fundamental uncertainties as the logical starting point for critical analysis of the IAEA’s safeguards. From the standpoint of achieving the objectives of verification, these uncertainties can be effectively managed by applying the concept of risk governance. The result of application of risk governance is a procedure that acknowledges both the technical and the political components of verification, while simultaneously enhancing the transparency of the IAEA’s operation, the credibility of the verification assurance, and the timeliness of identification of violations. The concept assists with distinguishing the roles of the IAEA’s Secretariat (risk identification and risk analysis) and the international community of states (risk evaluation and risk treatment) in each of the phases of verification. The Secretariat should focus on the structured provision of technical information to states. This thesis proposes refinements to the state level concept and new ‘Automatic Notice’ procedure to transform the existing, potentially political bases for the allocation of safeguards resources into transparent and objective criteria. Once the Secretariat has reported the existence of unresolved anomalies in the implementation of a safeguards agreement, a declaration of non-compliance and any subsequent international enforcement action are political decisions and must be left in the hands of states. The Automatic Notice procedure clarifies the operation of the Secretariat when compliance issues arise. It also provides states, whether acting through the IAEA’s Board of Governors or otherwise, with opportunities to craft effective solutions to potential proliferation crises.